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ABSTRACT 
This essay deals with the issue of deregulating and regulating formerly monopolised 
industries. After presenting some general background information on electricity markets and 
presenting the potential risks of market failures I will have a closer look at the changes in the 
electricity industries in New Zealand and Germany and their change from the "light-handed" 
version of reform to sector specific regulation. Furthermore I will ex.amine whether the current 
regulatory framework meets the countries' needs. 
Both New Zealand and Germany are the only countries in the world which have tried to 
liberalise their electricity markets without a sector specific regulator and trusted in the self 
regulatory agreements of the industry. This attempt was just partially successful. One step to 
achieve the objective of a balance between economic and public interests is to implement a 
competitive environment in the electricity industry under the control of a regulator. New Zealand 
has already established the Electricity Commission as a specific sector regulator for generation, 
retail and transmission. The monopoly sector of network access is regulated by the Commerce 
Commission. The statute to establish a regulator in Germany became effective on 13 July 2005. 
Word Length 
The text of this paper (excluding table of contents, bibliography, abstract and footnotes) 
comprises approx.imately 15,538 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
Many countries have radically changed the design of their electricity 
industries. Appropriate market design is essential as poor market design can lead 
to under-investment in generation and transmission capacity, unnecessary 
outages and abuses of market power. The features of an optimal market design 
will vary as there is no universally appropriate model. Many reforming countries 
have set up independent regulators with responsibility for price control over 
monopoly segments of the lines businesses. Regardless of the model adopted the 
essential requirement for economic growth and sustainable development is still 
the provision of efficient, reliable and affordable infrastructure services. 
This research paper examines the development of New Zealand's and 
Germany's electricity industries and their course to the latest design of a sector 
specific regulator. Both are the only IEA1 countries which have chosen the model 
of unregulated third-party access as the starting point of liberalisation. 
New Zealand's electricity industry reform started in the mid 1980s. Its 
industry has been through fundamental changes since then flowing into the 
establishment of the Electricity Commission. 
In Germany, liberalisation started in 1998 following the implementation of 
the EU Electricity Directive 96/92 which required a market-opening for 
monopoly industries.2 
The main developments of both countries to reform the electricity industry 
show some very similar features and experiences, despite different starting points 
and differences in the priorities of the regulator's work and the underlying 
policies. 
1 The International Energy Agency is an independent agency within the OECD. 
2 Directive 96/92/EC, Official Journal L 027, 30/01/1997, 20. 
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II DEFINITIONS AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
A The Main Features of the Electricity Industry 
Generally, the term "utility" is applied to the communications, energy, 
transport and public amenities sectors, including telecommunications, waste 
disposal, broadcasting, electricity, gas, railways, sewerage and water.3 Two main 
aspects characterise a utility. First, it offers transport service through a network, 
which becomes natural monopoly because of its extent and second, the provided 
service is an essential input for other main industries. Efficient operation of 
utilities is of high importance for the efficiency and output of industrial 
customers and it is also vital to the public interest.4 Reliable and well-priced 
electricity is essential for international competitiveness, growth and economic 
wealth of a country.5 
Electricity utilities worldwide were organised very similarly as mostly 
publicly owned, vertically integrated monopolies: responsible for the primary 
businesses of generation, transmission, distribution and supply within exclusive 
retail areas. In many countries, the economic performance varied and was 
characterised by high operating costs, construction costs on new facilities that 
were driven by political pressures and high retail prices to cover these costs 
which also impacted production costs of other industries.6 The typical structure 
had its source in the unusual physical and economic features of electricity which 
distinguishes it from other commodities and which limits and complicates the 
scope for competition and reliable market mechanisms. 7 These particular 
qualities have to be kept in mind when designing a successful market and 
3 Dr Alfred E Kahn The Economics of Regulation: Principles and Institutions (MIT Press, 
Cambridge, Mass., 1995) I 10. 
4 A Bollard and M Pickford "Utility Regulation in New Zealand" in ME Beesley (ed) Regulating 
Utilities: Broadening the Debate (IEA Monograph, London: !EA, 1997) 75, 93. 
5 Ioannis N Kessides Reforming Infrastructure - Privatization, Regulation and Competition. A 
World Bank Policy Research Report (Oxford University Press and World Bank, Washington, 
2004) 133. 
6 Paul L Joskow "Electricity Sector Restructuring and Competition: Lessons Learned" (2003) 40 
No 121 Latin American Journal of Economics 549, 550. 
7 Joskow, above n 6, 55 I. 
regulatory authority to avoid market failures.8 First, there is the inability to store 
power economically: electricity is the ultimate real-time product with production 
and consumption occurring at necessarily at the same time. 
9 Physical laws 
require the match of varying demand and supply at any location of the grid to 
maintain frequency, voltage and stability of the overall system.
10 In addition 
electricity lacks substitutes: the consumer has no other options, if prices are too 
high or the product is unavailable. 11 The management of the combination and 
interaction of these features and the vital role of electricity in modern society 
legitimised the vertically integrated model 12• 
B Economic Analyses and Market Failure 
There are several indicators for potential market failure that are inherent in 
the electricity industry's components of generation, transmission, distribution 
and retail, which lead to different regulatory tools for each segment. In this 
section, the main characteristics of each of these key businesses of the electricity 
industry will be highlighted, as well as the main features of efficiency and the 
risk of market failure. 
Basic economic theory favours voluntary market transactions, which lead to 
economic efficiency through the price mechanism, triggered by both consumer 
demand and the supplier reaching a general equilibrium. 13 Economic efficiency 
means that resources are allocated in a way that affords their most valuable use, 
thus maximising social economic welfare. Market transactions are assumed to 
lead to a Pareto improvement. This means that a market transaction leads to a 
result where at least one person is made better off and none is worse off. 
8 Kessides, above n 5, 133. 
9 Steve Thomas Electricity Liberalisation: The Beginning of the End (2004) Research 
commissioned by Public Services International Research Unit (University of Greenwich) for the 
World Energy Council Congress Sydney, 5-9 September 2004 <http://www.psiru.org> (last 
accessed 22 June 2005). 
10 Joskow, above n 6,551. 
11 Thomas, above n 9, 9. 
12 Kessides, above n 5, 134. 
13 Edward E Zajac Political Economy of Fairness (The MIT Press, Massachusetts, 1995) 17. 
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Voluntary transactions are generally regarded as mutually beneficial to both 
parties, because it is unlikely that a party would enter into a contract without 
believing it would lead to a better result. These market mechanisms normally 
apply in a perfect competitive environment. This key feature to reach allocative 
efficiency does not work properly in the electricity industry; however, because of 
the industry's unique characteristics, monopoly and market power behaviour, and 
complex contractual relations between several parties which exacerbate the 
establishment of a working market. State regulation is justified if the market does 
not achieve economic efficiency and the benefits of intervention outweigh the 
costs. There are three key kinds of market failures: monopoly and market power, 
externalities, and information asymmetry, which are outlined below within the 
context of the primary businesses of the electricity industry. 14 
1 Generation 
Generation is the production of electricity. 15 All generating technologies 
involve the transformation of energy sources such as oil, gas, nuclear power, 
hydro power, wind power or sunlight into electricity. The differences in the 
generating technologies are mainly the cost structure and their varying use for 
generating base, intermediate or peak loads for the demand side. 16 The diversity 
of generating technologies within one economy improves efficiency and 
enhances the stability of the network systems and the balance of supply and 
demand in real time. 17 
In a perfect market every seller is a price taker and cannot affect market price 
as consumers or buyers would swap to another supplier if they did raise their 
prices above competition level. 18 The generation market of most economies 
usually consists of a few generators delivering to the wholesale market. A market 
14 Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen Law and Economics (Pearson Addison Wesley, Boston, 
London, 2004) 46. 
15 Faye Steiner Regulation, Industry Structure and Performance in the Electricity Supply Industry 
(2001) No. 32 OECD Economic Studies, 143, 147. 
16 Steiner, above n 15, 147. 
17 Steiner, above n 15, 147. 
18 Sally Hunt Making Competition Work in Electricity (John Wiley & Sons, New York, 2002) 89. 
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with only a few players tends to show monopoly characteristics as market prices 
can be set to a higher extent than in a perfect market. 19 As in a monopoly, 
generators have realised that the reduction of output the market price can be set 
to some extent. This market behaviour would lead to high prices on the 
wholesale market. High profits gained with existing generation capacities remove 
any incentives to the generator to invest in more economically efficient or 
environmentally friendly technologies or to decrease costs for the benefit of 
consumers. 
Entry barriers are high as the planning and the building of a power plant takes 
at least six years. To be efficient for the investor, a plant has to be of a certain 
size and all costs covered before even one kilowatt-hour is generated and sold.20 
Of course the grade of future demand can be estimated but a high degree of 
insecurity in this development rests for potential new players: even if the future 
demand met expectations, technological advances are not foreseeable, which 
means that it is likely that increasing demand could be partially balanced by new 
and more efficient technologies. Generation capacities above demand are sunk 
costs which increase social welfare by the existence of unused facilities. These 
entry barriers complicate the establishment of a generation market regulated by 
competition as the number of sellers will usually be restricted to a few. 
Generation also implies negative externalities for third parties. A negative 
externality occurs when costs of an exchange or decision impact third parties not 
explicitly involved in the exchange or the decision which means the party 
producing the impact does not bear all society's costs.21 Emissions, waste of the 
production process using fossil burning such as gas, oil and coal, are responsible 
for defects in the ozone layer and consequently for climate change caused by 
greenhouse effect. Even the application of renewable energy sources like hydro 
or wind could have an impact on local environment. In respect of this huge 
19 Hunt, above n 16, 89. 
20 Zajac, above n 13, 33. 
21 Zajac, above n 13, 35-36. 
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impact to society, policy makers consider on regulations minimising those costs 
for society. 22 
2 Transmission and Distribution 
Transmission comprises the inter-region transportation of electricity via high-
voltage lines and the management of electricity feed in to maintain stability, 
voltage and frequency of the network.23 Distribution is the low-voltage transport 
on local level. 
Line businesses are the archetype of a natural monopoly in which generally a 
single company is the only supplier of a particular kind of product or service due 
to the fundamental cost structure. Competition in the provision of transmission 
would lead to socially wasteful and inefficient facility duplication.24 In economic 
terms the service can be produced more cheaply by one firm than if it is divided 
among several competitors.25 However, the absence of any effective competition 
enables the network operator to misuse the monopoly power to generate high 
profits to the detriment of consumers and economic welfare.26 There is also a 
significant risk that the networks may act as a barrier to efficient competition in 
up and downstream markets and prevent new market participants providing other 
services while cross subsidising in case of vertical integration by the profits 
gained in the network. 
This inherent characteristic of the network industry reflects the major 
problem: to reach economic efficiency the network operator must at least be able 
to gain profits on a base of the return of investments and at the same time be 
restrained from charging excessive network access fees as well as being cost 
22 Thomas, above n °9, 9. 
23 Steiner, above n 15, 147. 
24 Stephen P King "Pricing for Infrastructure Access: The Economic Foundations of Access 
Pricing" (1997) 4 Competition & Consumer Law Journal 203, 204. 
25 Graham Shuttleworth "Opening European Electricity and Gas Markets" in Colin Robson 
Utility Regulation and Competition Policy (Edward Elgar Publishing Cheltenham UK, 2002) 128, 
138. 
26 King, above n 24, 204. 
orientated. The imbalance of these three interests, usually obvious by irrationally 
high network fees, requires state intervention.27 Network businesses are therefore 
prone to market failure mainly due to their natural monopoly characteristics and 
regulatory policy-makers paying close attention to the market behaviour of firms 
which control such essential facilities. 28 
3 Retail 
Retail is the sale of electricity to the consumer, including services such as 
metering, billing, and marketing.29 It is basically competitive. 
Since electricity is regarded as a commodity it should be assumed that in a 
free market with lots of participants on both sides, sellers and buyers should 
reach economic efficiency in terms of the Pareto principle. The customer choice 
model should in theory represent the optimum of a free market. This economic 
idea only works very partially within the retail sector. Retail markets generally 
show a tendency to very low margins as old-established firms shift profits to the 
monopoly businesses. Whereas market failures in other parts of the businesses 
heavily impact upon the retail market, benefits from competition, restructuring or 
regulation of the previous stages of the supply chain never fully reach the 
domestic consumer to the full extent because these benefits are skimmed 
beforehand. In contrast, large consumers profit from cost orientated restructuring 
and demand orientated production due to market power on the buyer's side. 
In addition to the impacts of market failures from the other parts of the 
businesses there is another major problem within the industry: the informational 
asymmetries. This occurs when one party to a transaction has more information 
than the other party. Typically the seller knows more about the product than the 
27 Marcus Schneider "Little Fish in a Big Pond" Working Paper (University of Berkley Energy 
and Resources Group 1998) 10. 
28 Shuttleworth, above n 25, 38. 
29 Steiner, above n 15, 148. 
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buyer.30 The inequality of information between the contracting parties can distort 
a fair exchange, particularly as electricity is a standardised product, where the 
main differing component is the price.31 In the retail market, where one party, 
namely the consumer, is not an electricity expert, there is a danger of market 
failure caused by information asymmetries concerning pricing components and 
modalities of the change processes. 
4 Social concerns 
It is inevitable that any reform of this vital sector raises questions about 
social impact. 32 In the past, electricity utilities are often given additional 
responsibilities which might not be voluntarily undertaken in a competitive 
environment. The consideration of at least a minimum standard of social 
responsibility such as a focus on local equality instead of "cherry picking", 
discounted rates or special payment methods for deprived consumers reflect a 
responsibility to support disadvantaged groups gain access to essential 
facilities. 33 These social concerns can be met by the participation of consumer 
rights protection groups in the reform process, which is practised in most modern 
countries. 
The second major concern is likely job loss caused by cost pressure and 
restructuring. Industries in generally robust economies have largely addressed 
this problem in a constructive and robust manner. 34 Early retirement packages 
were offered; others were trained and shifted for the expanding service 
businesses in retail or moved into related services of new consulting firms or new 
service providers so that the social impact of restructuring in the electricity sector 
could be minimal. 
JO Zajac, above n , 63. 
J I Cooter and Ulen, above n 14, 46. 
32 Department of Trade and Industry "The Social Effects of Energy Liberali sation - The UK 
Experience" Conference Paper launching a Common European Energy Market (Lisboa, 5-6 
June 2000) 1. 
11 Department of Trade and Industry, above n 32, 2. 
H Department of Trade and Industry, above n 32, 2. 
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5 Evaluation 
In summary the electricity industry contains several serious risk factors for 
market failure within its key businesses generation, transmission, distribution and 
retail. In particular the abuse of market and monopoly power in the cost intensive 
lines and generation businesses causing underinvestment impact on related 
markets and the barriers for market entrance, the information asymmetries on the 
retail market and the unavoidable existence of externalities such as 
environmental and health issues characterise the electricity businesses. Since all 
businesses are very closely related to each other flawed market transactions 
impact generally related businesses. 
C Competition in Fonnerly Monopolised Markets 
I Creating electricity markets 
To address these risks of market failures damaging overall economic 
performances and to improve performance, most developed countries 
restructured their electricity industries. The reforms have covered far-reaching 
changes such as privatisation, corporatisation, the unbundling of potentially 
competitive segments from the natural monopolies, the establishment of 
wholesale and retail markets and to a large extent the implementation of market 
regulatory mechanisms.35 The primary goal of the industry's reform has been to 
design new governance structures that provide long-term benefits to customers 
by realising open markets for electricity. 
Deregulation was the linchpin for this reform which was expected to enable 
improvement of the quality of life of citizens. This was to be achieved, by 
reducing prices, providing increased choices for products and services of 
competing market participants, and open a way for the reform of economic 
35 Joskow, above n 6, 549. 
structures propelled by the entrepreneurship through eliminating, as much as 
possible, government interference in private business activities. 
The basic idea was the restructuring of the industry in order to achieve 
competition through a number of designs. In particular developed countries have 
passed legislation to stimulate competition in the industry. 36 Several common 
key components can be identified. The vertical separation of the competitive 
businesses from the lines businesses structurally, functionally or financially plays 
a major role. This process started with opening up the networks to independent 
generators and continued with the corporatisation or privatisation of public 
owned firms. 37 The central argument for initiating this trend of restructuring 
worldwide was the idea that private ownership under pressure of competition and 
shareholders looking for return of their investments will lower costs and lead to 
an efficient organisation of the firms. It would also lead to the application of 
more effective technologies and the promotion of innovation to optimise 
outcomes to the benefit of the customers.38 Thus the splitting of ownership and 
the unbundling of the electricity industry has been an integral part of nearly all 
infrastructure reforms in industrial economies with a wide scope from success to 
total failure. 39 
This basic concept was also a renunciation of the traditional economic 
consensus and has set aside the conservative notion of network related industries 
as natural monopolies as such.40 
Based on a number of experiences, economists identified several critical 
factors for a successful creation of a competitive market within the electricity 
. d 41 m ustry. 
36 Joskow, above n 6, 550. 
37 Michael G Pollitt Ownership and Performance in Electric Utilities (Ox.ford University Press 
Ox.ford 1995) 2. 
38 Pollit, above n 37,l. 
39 Kessides, above n 5, 2. 
40 Kessides, above n 5, 4. 
41 Robert Pritchard & Philip Andrews Speed "Eight Principles of Electricity Industry Reform" 
(2000) 7, Article 2 The Journal, Centre for Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law and Policy, 
University of Dundee, l <http://www.dundee.ac.uk> (last accessed 28 June 2005). 
In addition to the principles of unbundling and deregulation, the creation of a 
working wholesale market with established trading rules, where generators as 
well as several local retailers compete with each other is another important 
element of reform. 42 Ideally there will be a continuous incentive for all 
competing generators to keep the prices low, efficiency as high as possible and 
d . l . l 43 spen capita w1se y. 
Furthermore the appointment of an independent system operator, which is not 
involved in any competition, to control, administer and maintain the technical 
requirements of electricity trade is an essential feature which is closely connected 
to the crucial question of who has the right of access to the networks. 44 The 
installation of equitable and non-discriminatory terms of network access is the 
basis for creating a competitive environment and functioning markets. 
Generators and retailers have to be sure that they can participate in the 
market. 45 A binding grid code accomplished by an independent regulator has 
emerged as the most efficient ruling system in terms of market efficiency.46 The 
grid code pricing scheme for a fair infrastructure access should follow four main 
principles: it has to imply incentives and benefits for all market participants; the 
price set should reflect the real social cost of the product; has to assure the 
efficient investment in maintenance and new facilities over time; and it has to 
take social goals such as the protection of the environment and the public interest 
into consideration.47 
Reality of network access pricing has shown that there is no theoretical all-in-
one device suitable for every purpose so the development of infrastructure access 
has to be accompanied by the attentive consideration of special regional market 
features. 48 
42 Pritchard & Speed, above n 41 , 4. 
43 Pritchard & Speed, above n 41, 5. 
44 Joskow, above n 6, 552. 
45 Pritchard & Speed, above n 41 , 8. 
46 Pritchard & Speed, above n 41, 8. 
47 King, above n 24, 206. 
48 King, above n 24, 218. 
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2 Regulating the new markets 
As described above the susceptibility of the electricity industry for market 
failures needs to be dealt through regulation.49 Regulation can be broadly defined 
as a "sustained and focused control exercised by a public agency over activities 
that are valued by community". so The crucial point to implement a successful 
reform is the establishment of an independent and professional regulatory agency, 
which is a requirement to achieve the benefits of liberalised infrastructure. The 
OECD recommends principles of "good regulation" to address the risks of 
potential market failures which corresponds to the modem theory of economic 
regulation. Thus good regulation should [ ... )51 
(i) serve clearly identified policy goals, and be effective in achieving those goals; 
(ii) have a sound legal and empirical basis; 
(iii) produce benefits that justify costs, considering the distribution of effects across 
society and taking economic, environmental and social effects into account; 
(iv) minimise costs and market distortions; 
(v) promote innovation through market incentives and goal-based approaches; 
(vi) be clear, simple, and practical for users; 
(vii) be consistent with other regulations and policies; and 
(viii) be compatible as far as possible with competition, trade and investment-facilitating 
principles at domestic and international levels. 
To clarify the meanings of these broad guidelines the OECD introduces 
specific measures for a successful regulatory regime to check performance of 
national regulators.52 
In regard to the recommendations the most important yardstick for success is 
the commitment at the highest possible level to the content of the policy 
underlying the reform accompanied by the clear and understandable articulation 
49 Colin Kirkpatrick & David Parker "Theory of Economic Regulation: A Framework for 
Analysing Practice in Developing Asia" (2004) No. 60 Research Paper Asia Development Bank 
Institute 10 <http://www.adbi.org> (last accessed 29 June 2005). 
50 P Selznick "Focusing Organizational Research on Regulation" in R. Noll Regulatory Policy 
and Social Sciences (University of California Press, Berkley, 1985) 363. 
51 OECD "Guiding Principles for Regulatory Quality and Performance 2005'', 3. 
52 OECD "Guiding Principles", above n 51 , 5. 
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of the reform goals, strategies and benefits to the public.53 Indeed, transparency 
and an open communication in reference to the public seem to be an 
underestimated key factor for success of regulatory reforms. The establishment 
of political reforms can provoke fear and uncertainty because of the change to 
familiar standards. In terms of "electricity" as a vital product for economy as 
well as for private households, the success is often measured only with the 
amount invoiced on the power bill, directly affecting all consumers. But it is not 
the only measure because even rising prices by regulating the sector are not 
necessarily contradictory to the overall success of a reform process as prices 
reflecting the social costs of the unit produced could be higher than previous 
ones. 
The exercise of continuous review and systematic monitoring of economic, 
social and administrative effects of regulatory reform against the OECD 
principles is another feature of the intended success. The starting point for 
reflection should be the perspective of those affected by the regulator rather than 
that of the authority. 54 To achieve the policy's objective altemati ves of regulatory 
tools such as self-regulation should be considered to avoid bureaucracy and 
regulatory costs. Against this background the costs of regulation in comparison 
to the benefits has to be kept in mind. 
A major issue to measure regulatory reform quality is the grade of 
transparency and the non-discrimination of decisions and processes set up by the 
regulator as well as the process of application and the establishment of an appeal 
process. 55 This success factor includes particularly intensive consulting and 
submission rounds with all stakeholders from an early stage, including the 
public.56 This recommendation reflects the policy to cover as many interests as 
possible. It is impossible for one regulatory regime to perfectly fit all interests, 
but the integration of all significantly affected groups has the best chance of 
success. 
53 OECD "Guiding Principles", above n 51 , 3. 
54 OECD "Guiding Principles", above n 51 , 4. 
55 OECD "Guiding Principles", above n 51, 4. 
56 OECD "Guiding Principles", above n 51 , 5. 
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Issues concerning the abuse of market power, monopoly and anticompetitive 
merger risks should be covered by competition law and not by the regulatory 
authority to promote a double tracked strategy of law enforcement and sector 
regulation.57 Consequently the design of the powers of the competition authority 
should be designed to foster reform. 
The design of regulation should be stimulating competition and efficiency 
rather than restricting the free market. They should just set the frame to facilitate 
and support competition.58 The focus is on the non-discriminatory and fair ruling 
of access to essential monopoly facility structures, as well as on the separation of 
competitive and non-competitive elements of the industry. All regulatory tools 
like price caps, benchmarks or incentives should encourage investments and 
efficiency gains leading to competitiveness.59 
Certainly these yardsticks can not be examined in isolation as they are 
inseparably linked to various other matters such as reliability, safety, health, 
consumer protection, and environmental and resources issues. The level of 
productive interaction with other authorities dealing with these issues is also a 
measure for the quality of a reform process. The success and acceptance of the 
reform also depend heavily on the consistency of non-regulatory policies.60 In 
particular, issues concerning taxation, subsidies and public procurement are 
external factors which could have a severe impact on the reform performance. 
Thus coordination of regulatory tools with policies of subsidisation, taxation and 
public procurement improve the prospects for success. 
As discussed above, the major barriers against the electricity industry 
reaching efficient market performance include those for new market participants 
in the competitive businesses built up by the abuse of market power especially 
concerning pricing and investment behaviour and the risks of market failure 
caused by monopoly structures. An ideal regulator should in the first instance be 
responsible for regulating market entry, network access ruling, effective pricing, 
57 OECD "Guiding Principles", above n 51, 5. 
58 OECD "Guiding Principles", above n 51 , 6. 
59 OECD "Guiding Principles", above n 51 , 7. 
60 OECD "Guiding Principles", above n 51 , 7. 
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service standards and consumer protection.61 To perform tasks the regulator may 
differ in organisation and power from other state agencies. For long-term and 
effective regulation the regulator should be largely free from political and of 
course from the utilities' influences. Due to the close connection between politics 
and the electricity industry in most countries, policies are often high influenced 
by lobbyists. The optimal organisational structure could be a set up by statute, 
free of ministerial control to stay objective in setting policy. 62 These 
considerations suggest the most suitable funding arrangement of the agencies' 
operation is through fees paid by the industry rather than being exposed to 
political interfering by the budget process.63 As infrastructure regulation is an 
important policy issue there has also to be a strong focus on the necessary 
efficiency of the regulatory agency. Accountability by a prompt and effective 
redress process, transparency of decision making and regulatory processes with 
easy administration and guiding principles, predictability concerning the rule of 
law, especially the respect for precedent are fundamental prerequisites for 
efficiency and gaining the confidence of market participants.64 
Nevertheless the degree of effectiveness and independency also depends 
heavily on the political culture, the social tradition of a country and the 
commitment of the government. 65 Regulatory regimes are therefore always 
subject to compromise of the existing institutional frameworks but should always 
. f h . 66 aim or t e optimum. 
III NEW ZEALAND'S APPROACH 
A The Monopoly Market 
In the 1970s and 80s New Zealand was facing severe economic problems 
caused by England's joining of the European Economic Community and the oil 
61 Pritchard & Speed, above n 41, 8. 
62 Kessides, above n 5, 85. 
63 Kessides, above n 5, 85. 
64 Pritchard & Speed, above n 41, 9. 
65 Pritchard & Speed, above n 41, 9. 
66 Pritchard & Speed, above n 41, 9. 
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crisis.67 Suddenly the country was confronted with economic stagnation, high 
inflation, and balance of payment deficits, a high unemployment rate and 
crashing commodity prices. 68 The Government tried to control these problems 
through state intervention by trying to protect the economy with tariffs and 
subsidies. The rising inflation was combated by a price freeze for basic goods 
and then subsequently by a salary freeze. 69 
At that time, electricity utilities were large and inefficient statutory 
monopolies. The State Owned Enterprises (SOE) produced an overall outcome of 
10 per cent of the country against 20 per cent of total investment.70 Electrocorp 
(ECNZ) operated most of the generation and transmission capacities and set 
prices for bulk electricity, and was supervised by the Department of Energy 
(Electricity Division NZED). Retail was administered by the Electricity Supply 
Authorities (ESA), which were organised in Municipal Electricity Departments 
or Electric Power Boards with guaranteed retail areas.71 
The business policy resembled a social service policy and focused on public 
welfare rather than being a profit orientated organisation, leading to low 
household prices subsidised by industrial consumers. Investment behaviour was 
motivated by political reasons and not by economic or technical needs, and also 
by conflict between social and commercial objectives, political interference. 
Lack of accountability and monitoring of performance also lead to inadequate 
perforrnance.72 In 1984 the electricity industry had produced almost$ 22 billion 
in public debts. This economic pressure initiated massive reforms of the sector.73 
67 Neil Rennie Power to the People, 100 Years of Public Electricity Supply in New Zealand 
(Bookprint Consultants Ltd, Wellington, 1989) 197. 
68 Rennie, above n 67, 197. 
69 Jon Johansen Political leadership in New Zealand (PhD Thesis, Victoria University of 
Wellington, 2002) 172. 
70 Brian Easton The Commercialisation of New Zealand (Auck.land University Press, Auck.land, 
1997) 7. 
71 Bollard & Pickford, above n 4, 112. 
72 Bollard & Pickford, above n 4, 94. 
73 Bollard & Pickford, above n 4, 78, 79. 
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B The Liberalisation Process between 1984 and 1991 
New Zealand started a liberalisation process which was attentively watched 
by economists and politicians around the world.74 The liberalisation regime is 
called "light-handed" and was regulated by the Commerce Commission and by 
self-governed industry bodies. 
The "light-handed" approach involved unburdening the market from 
Government intervention. The approach was to allow the free forces of 
entrepreneurship, self-interest and competition to generate efficiency and 
economic growth.75 The key features of the reform were the removal of nearly all 
statutory rights to expose utilities to competition, corporatisation, unbundling of 
competitive and monopoly parts, and the abolishment of funding relating to 
social service obligation. 76 This economic focus was a significant shift from 
traditional arguments concerning the need to balance reasonable prices and 
control services of national importance. 
Many state departments functions began being organised like private 
companies with strict economic targets.77 In 1986 the SOE Act introduced this 
approach as policy. At the same time, ownership of SOEs were mostly equally 
split between the Minister of Finance and the relevant ministry but decision 
making was removed from political influence to boards of directors.78 
The deregulation of the energy sector took place early.79 In 1987 NZED assets 
were all incorporated in ECNZ. In the following year the line and generation 
businesses were separated and Transpower was founded as a subsidiary of ECNZ 
running the transmission business under a commercial structure. Further reform 
followed a task force recommendation to extend the reform to the retail market in 
74 Bollard & Pickford, above n 4, 75. 
75 Brian Easton "Economic and Other Tdeas Behind the New Zealand Reform" (1994) 10 No 3 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 78. 
76 Alan Bollard "Utility Regulation in New Zealand" in ACCC Training Program on Utility 
Regulation (Melbourne Business School 10-14 November 1997) 2. 
<http://www.comcom.govt.nz> (last accessed I August 2005). 
77 Easton, above n 70, 17 8. 
78 State Owned Enterprise Act 1986, s 6. 
79 Bollard & Pickford, above n 4, 82. 
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deregulating the ESA by corporatisation and removal of statutory protective 
rights. 80 The reformers were not concerned about the danger of market power 
abuse and believed that expected problems could be solved with the "light-
handed" regulation and the Commerce Act 1986. The recommendations had 
effect under the Electric Power Boards Amendment Act 1990, allowing the 
Government to appoint new ESA commercial board members, which would later 
direct the new retail companies, whereas the old elected board members became 
trustees of the firms. 81 
C The Liberalisation Process between 1992 and 1998 
1 The Electricity Act 1992 
The Electricity Act 1992 enforced competition in abolishing exclusive retail 
areas and corporatisation soon followed. Accompanying this, an information 
policy was established forcing the companies to disclose annual financial 
statements for their key businesses and account for these businesses separately82• 
The effects of the reforms were minor as the incumbents continued to behave as 
in pre-liberalisation times.83 At that time, industry self-regulatory bodies called 
the New Zealand Electricity Market (NZEM) and the Metering and 
Reconciliation Information Agreement (MARIA), governed the electricity 
· d 84 m ustry. 
To break the power monopoly, distribution and generation were split up 
through the separation of Transpower from ECNZ in 1994. There was then the 
possibility to split ECNZ into smaller companies which could compete on the 
generation market and also could be more easily sold. This development was also 
80 Electricity Task Force 1988, 7. 
81 Power Boards Amendment Act 1990. 
82 Electricity Act 1992, sl 70. 
83 Paula Rebstock "The New Zealand Experience in Utility Regulation" in Conference Papers -
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission Regulatory Conference (Sea World Nara 
Resort 30 July 2004) 5. 
84 NZEM and MARIA governed the industry from 1 October 1996 to I March 2004. 
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supported by the introduction of the Electricity Information Disclosure Act 1994 
which required public information disclosure particularly for the natural 
monopoly businesses.85 
In 1995 the Government announced the final recommendations for the 
operation of a wholesale market. 86 It was designed to meet the needs of straight 
supply and demand and allowed generators to compete directly with each other. 
This pure demand-supply orientated real time market was secured with long term 
saleable hedge contracts. Competition environment was set with the split of 
ECNZ into Contact Energy and ECNZ. 
The reform did not meet expectations. The network operators still focused on 
their natural monopolies and kept new retail market participants away. They also 
controlled the hedge market products to the detriment of independent retailers 
and traders, which could not get transparent prices under fair conditions to secure 
their potential business risks. In cross-subsidising retail prices with the profit 
from the distribution network business, the big players also dumped the prices 
for pure energy so new retailers could not break into this market. 
Because of this behaviour it was also almost impossible for customers to change 
their retailer and for new players to participate in the market which might have 
h · b 87 put some pressure on t e mcum ents. 
2 Electricity Reform Package 1998 
To advance progress the Government announced a new reform package. 88 The 
main purpose of the policy was to put downstream pressure on market 
participants of all stages of the process to the benefit of consumers.89 Besides 
some gains the wholesale market development showed some signs of market 
85 Rebstock, above n 83, 4. 
86 Government Policy Statement Wholesale Electricity Reform, Regulation of the Electricity Lines 
Businesses (Wellington, June 1995). 
87 Rebstock, above n 83, 5. 
88 Ministry of Economic Development "A Better Deal for Electricity Consumers" (Wellington, 
1998) <http://www.med.govt.nz> (last accessed 2 August 2005). 
89 Ministry of Economic Development "A Better Deal for Electricity Consumers", above n 88. 
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failure as ECNZ were still operating and controlling about 70 per cent of the 
generation market. The lack of upstream competition had lead to high spot 
market and contract prices, weak future price signals due to inadequate 
incentives for future planning, over capacity and a waste of fuel running 
inefficient plants with no cost pressure.90 
The main policy problems in the distribution and retail sectors concerned the 
exercise of natural monopoly power of distribution lines to the detriment of 
consumers and high barriers for market entry of new companies built up by the 
incumbents. Smaller local generation capacities were also used to cross-subsidise 
their own retail departments to minimise retail profits.91 
To solve the upstream market problems ECNZ was split into three separate 
companies. Details of the separation were delivered by the Electricity Reform 
Transition Unit92 which required separation of ownership of line businesses from 
retail and generation between 1999 and 2003. 93 At the same time, lines 
companies had to face strict requirements under the Electricity Requirements Act 
1994 and the threat of price controls under the Commerce Act. 
Finally the Electricity Industry Reform Act 1998 banned the ownership of 
retail and generation by any line businesses within one company to put pressure 
on the incumbent utility operators to break their self-protective and anti-
competitive behaviour. 94 Furthermore the industry was expected to establish a 
system for consumers who want to change retailer and abolish the introduced 
anti-competitive hurdles for new retail firms or face stringent regulation.95 
90 Ministry of Economic Development "A Better Deal for Electricity Consumers", above n 88. 
91 Ministry of Economic Development "A Better Deal for Electricity Consumers", above n 88. 
92Electricity Reform Transition Unit "Final Report" (Wellington, 1998) 
<http://www.med.govt.nz> (last accessed 2 August 2005) . 
93 Ministry of Economic Development "A Better Deal for Electricity Consumers", above n 88. 
94 Electricity Industry Reform Act 1998, Parts 1-5. Local retail companies are still allowed to 
own minor generation capacities. 
95 Ministry of Economic Development "A Better Deal for Electricity Consumers", above n 88. 
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D State Intervention 
1 The turning point 
The aims of the 1998 reform were dampened later that year, when the report 
of the Auckland power supply failure was published. 96 Apart from the hot 
weather, management and planning failures of the operating company, Mercury 
Energy, were held responsible for the blackout in Auckland's CBD. However, 
criticism of the reform as such increased when it became clear that Mercury had 
ignored warning signs of limited capacity and life time of their major cable 
leading into Auckland.97 
Mercury's aggressive takeover strategies implied the suspicion that Mercury 
spent money to expand and not to maintain the infrastructure and lead to the 
conclusion that the failure was caused by a free market. 98 This experience 
challenged the belief of a successful free market-based electricity system. 
Additionally, in 1999 suspicion of market arrangements were implicated when 
several companies increased their prices significantly 99 • Due to frustrated 
consumers, increasing prices and several blackouts, the idea of state intervention 
as a policy option came to the fore. 
The Government was still of the opinion, however, that the chosen market 
system was a good approach for the industry and the consumer's needs with 
regulation only necessary in certain circumstances. 
96 Ministerial Inquiry "Auckland Power Supply Failure 1998: The Report of the Ministerial 
Inquiry into the Auckland Power Supply Failure" (Plan and Print, Auckland, 1998). 
97 Report of the Ministerial Inquiry, above n 96, 12. 
98 Bill Rosenberg and Jane Kelsey "The Privatisation of New Zealand's Electricity Services" in 
Conference Papers for SME Conference (Mexico City, 20-27 September 1999) 12. 
99 Stephen Littlechild "Electricity: Regulatory Developments Around the World" in Colin 
Robinson (ed) Competition and Regulation in Utility Markets (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 
Northamton USA, 2003) 61, 64. 
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2 The 2000 Power Package 
In response to these events a new Government Policy Statement was 
published with the overall objectives: 100 
/. { ] to ensure that electricity is delivered in an efficient, fair, reliable and 
environmentally sustainable manner to all classes of consumer. 
2. To meet this objective, the Government favours industry solutions where possible, but is 
prepared to use regulatory solutions where necessary. 
3. This Policy Statement sets out the Government's expectations for industry action and its 
views on governance matters. 
Consistent with these objectives, the Government was seeking the following 
'f' 101 spec1 1c outcomes: 
a. Energy and other resources are used efficiently, and in particular, hydro spill is 
minimised; 
b. risks relating to security of supply, in particular the risks of dry years and inadequate 
transmission and distribution security, are properly and efficiently managed; 
c. the full costs of producing and transporting each additional unit of electricity are 
signalled so that investors and consumers can make decisions consistelll with obtaining 
the most value from electricity; 
d. delivered electricity costs and prices are subject to sustained downward pressure; 
e. the quality of electricity services, and in particular trade-offs between quality and price, 
should as far as possible reflect customers' preferences; 
f transmission losses and constraints are signalled to ensure that overall costs to the 
economy, including the costs of insufficient competition in local regions, are minimised; 
and 
g. greenhouse gas emissions are minimised. 
The new policy addressed all of the problems mentioned earlier in New 
Zealand's electricity industry: to improve the inadequate situation in the vital 
areas of generation diversity and capacity; transmission and distribution security; 
and the realisation of price transparency and pressure by consumers and investors 
were at the centre of the new policy. It also documented the Government's 
100 Ministry of Economic Development "Government Policy Statement: Further Development of 
New Zealand's Electricity Industry". (Wellington, 2000) 2. 
101 Ministry of Economic Development "Government Policy Statement: Further Development of 
New Zealand's Electricity Industry", above n 100, 2. 
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determination to solve problems using the necessary tools of regulation to reach 
specific outcomes. 
3 Evaluation 
The New Zealand's Government's approach to intervene on a case-by-case 
basis was rational and appropriate for the era. It could be realistically assumed 
that the solution of the major problems in generation and the lines businesses 
would benefit all related markets and could be managed by the industry itself. 
The policy represented a remarkable change from the basic belief in the 
regulatory forces of the free market to state intervention, in the case where free 
market forces do not achieve the desired outcome. It meant the Government 
would intervene in sector regulation were industry solutions failed. 102 
Nevertheless the policy also gave the industry another chance to create 
progressive solutions to the well-known problems and in accordance with the 
Government policy. 
E Regulation by the Commerce Commission 
The "light-handed" reform process was supervised by the Commerce 
Commission, the primary competition regulatory agency established under the 
Commerce Act 1986. With the enactment of the Electricity Act 1992, the 
Commission started being heavily involved in managing competition complaints 
in the electricity industry. It soon became evident that greater transparency in 
pricing and profitability measures were not necessarily a sufficient check on the 
market behaviour of the incumbents. 103 The concerns of the Government that 
distributors would fail to provide low cost options to allow consumers to switch 
retailers was proven true, when the Commission investigated complaints against 
102 Ministry of Economic Development "Government Policy Statement: Further Development of 
New Zealand' s Electricity Industry", above n 100, 3. 
103 Rebstock, above n 83, 5. 
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Southpower in 1996-1997. 104 Restricted access of competing retailers to 
distribution networks and cross-subsidising were also factors in these complaints. 
The Electricity Reform Act 1998 extended the powers of the Commission to 
exempt businesses and persons from the provisions of the Act, especially in 
relation to questions dealing with ownership, mergers and cross-ownership. 105 
The Commerce Commission has an enforcement and adjudication role under the 
Act which was amended in 2001 providing power to control the access prices of 
line operators.106 This part of the Commission's work is funded by a levy on line 
companies. 107 
Three principle features govern the regulatory role of the Commerce 
Commission: 108 first, a system of regulating network access prices governed by 
the setting of initial thresholds, companies crossing either of the two thresholds 
are subject to further investigation on their performance by the Commission, 
which may warrant further examination which could lead to control of prices, 
revenues and quality; second, the transfer of the information disclosure regime 
for line businesses from the MED to the Commission and third, the monitoring 
and control of the system of valuation of the lines businesses. 109 
In response to the problems in the monopoly businesses the Commission 
designed the threshold regime to control market behaviour of line businesses. 110 
After extensive industry consultation the Commission gazetted the thresholds in 
June 2003. The Commission decided to set a price path threshold following the 
CPI - X 111 formulation and a quality threshold, both designed to provide 
incentives for the lines operators to improve efficiency, share the gained benefits 
104 Rebstock, above n 83, 5. 
105 Rebstock, above n 83, 6. 
106 Commerce Act 1986 Part 4 A, Commerce Amendment Act 2001. 
'
07 Electricity Line Owners (Commerce Commission Costs) Levy Regulation 200 I. 
JOB Commerce Commission "Electricity Lines Businesses" <http://www.comcom.govt.nz> (last 
accessed 3 August 2005). 
109 OECD "Competition Committee Annual Report on Competition Policy Developments in New 
Zealand September 2003-August 2004" (2004) 15. 
11° Commerce Commission "Annual Report Electricity Lines Businesses" (Wellington, June 2003) 
<http://www.comcom.govt.nz> (last accessed 3 August 2005). 
111 CPI-X is a pricing method where a price cap is automatically adjusted by Consumer Price 
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with consumers over a long-term period, be limited to gain excessive profits and 
secure the quality demanded by the consumer.112 The thresholds were reset for 
the period 2004 - 2009. 113 Under the initial thresholds set in June 2003 the 
assessment was completed for all 29 line businesses identifying 13 breaches of 
the price path threshold, but just three were under inquiry. 114 At the second 
assessment date in March 2004, 14 companies were identified as breaching the 
price path threshold, including one severe case, and 15 breaches of the quality 
threshold were asserted. 115 
The regulatory approach using a threshold regime, is competently tackling the 
potential abuse of monopoly power in the lines businesses. Dealing with natural 
monopolies requires some regulatory activities to address the risk of market 
failures described above. The risk of generating extreme high profits together 
with a lack of cost consciousness leads to inefficiency impacting upon other 
industries and abuse of the monopoly structure as a barrier to related markets. 
The targeted control of the Commission represents a safeguard against these 
dangers to force the industry to self-discipline rather than active intervention. 
Companies are just subject to control when one of the thresholds is breached. 
Thus the threshold regime is solely a screening mechanism to balance different 
interests in the market by identifying lines businesses whose performance may 
require further examination but counts on the self determination of the industry 
within a frame limited by the thresholds. The chosen combination of the price 
path and the quality threshold sets sufficient incentives for the companies to 
operate efficiently and to meet consumers' demands. The CPI-X price path 
threshold allows adjusting pricing but also establishes additional cost pressure in 
a non-competitive market. Furthermore the strict focus on the cost structure of 
the lines businesses also puts pressure on the pricing for retail as cross-
subsidisation and the shift of cost pools from one department to another is 
11 2 Commerce Commission "Regulation of Electricity Lines Businesses. Targeted Control 
Regime. Threshold Decisions" (Wellington 6 June 2005) 3. <http://www.comcom.govt.nz> (last 
accessed 3 August 2005). 
11 3 Commerce Commission "Regulation of Electricity Lines Businesses. Targeted Control 
Regime. Threshold Decisions" (Wellington, I April 2004) <http://www.comcom.govt.nz > (last 
accessed 3 August 2005). 
11 4 Commerce Commission "Annual Report 2003/2004" (Wellington, June 2004) 22. 
11 5 Commerce Commission, above n 114, 22. 
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excluded. This regulatory approach leaves the highest possible freedom of 
business policy with the companies. 
F Regulation by the Electricity Commission 
I The establishment of the Commission 
The 2000 electricity policy set up the Electricity Governance Establishment 
Committee (EGEC) to develop an integrated set of self-regulatory arrangements. 
A referendum was held in spring 2003 asking consumers, traders and lines 
businesses to vote on the proposed rulebook. 116 It did not reach the substantial 
majority needed to proceed with the implementation process. 117 Among the 
opponents were large consumers and consumer associations, and the big players 
like Transpower and Meridian Energy, New Zealand's largest generator and 
retailer. Facing the failure of the industry to establish fair self-regulating 
agreements and the expectation of another power shortage for the winter 2003, 
the Minister of Energy proposed the establishment of an independent sector 
regulator. 118 Apart from designing an adequate self-governing structure the 
industry had also failed to ensure future electricity supply and modernisation 
which was qualified as a significant risk for New Zealand's sustainable economic 
growth. It quickly became clear that the Government was no longer willing to 
accept the market behaviour of the industry and that it would set up a 
commission not only to set rules but also to play an active role in securing 
electricity supply. 119 
The provisions of the Electricity Act 1992 enabled the Minister to create a 
Crown entity without going through a consultation process if considered 
116 Electricity Governance Establishment Committee "Referendum" <http://www.egb.co.nz/ > 
(last accessed 4 August 2005). 
117 Electricity Governance Establishment Committee "Referendum Results" 
<http://www.egb.co.nz> (last accessed 4 August 2005) 
11 8 Cabinet Paper "Proposal to Establish an Electricity Commission" (Wellington, May 2003) 
<http://www.med.govt.nz> (last accessed 4 August 2005). 
11 9 Cabinet Paper "Electricity Security of Supply: Policy Settings" (Wellington, May 2003) 
<http://www.med.govt.nZ> (last accessed 4 August 2005). 
30 
necessary or desirable and urgent in the public interest. 120 In reaction to the 
failure of the industry the Electricity Commission was set up under the 
Electricity Amendment Act 2001 and began operating in September 2003. 
The Commission is funded by a levy on electricity companies. 121 Rates for 
generators, retailers, and lines companies are different and are subject to changes 
each year depending on the Commission's expected annual costs and the 
allocation of those costs to its activities. 
2 Power and tasks of the Commission 
The Commission is endowed with extensive powers to intervene m the 
industry which is contrary to the very "light-handed" history of reform. The 
principle objectives guiding the Commission's work are to ensure that electricity 
is produced and delivered to all classes of consumers in an efficient, fair, reliable, 
and environmentally sustainable manner and promote and facilitate the efficient 
use of electricity. The Government released the Policy Statement on Electricity 
Governance to specify the tasks, expectations and the considered role of the 
Commission. The Commission is required to achieve the following outcomes 
consistent with the overall objectives set out in the Electricity Act 1992: 122 
a. energy and other resources are used efficiently 
b. risks (including price risks) relating to security of supply are properly and efficiently 
managed 
c. barriers to competition in electricity are minimised for the long-term benefit of end-
users 
d. incentives for investment in generation, transmission, lines. energy efficiency, and 
demand-side management are maintained or enhanced and do not discriminate between 
public and private investment 
e. the full costs of producing and transporting each additional unit of electricity are 
signalled 
f delivered electricity costs and prices are subject to sustained downward pressure 
12° Cabinet Paper, above n 119. 
121 Electricity (Levy of Industry Participants) Regulations 2005. 
122 Ministry of Economic Development Hon Pete Hodgson "Government Policy Statement on 
Electricity Governance: Final Version" (Wellington, October 2004) <http://www.med.govt.nz> 
(last accessed 4 August 2005). 
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g. the electricity sector contributes to achieving the Government's climate change 
objectives by minimising unnecessary hydro spill, efficiently managing transmission and 
distribution losses and constraints, promoting demand-side management and energy 
efficiency, and removing barriers to investment in new generation technologies, 
renewables and distributed generation. 
The policy outlines the Commission's powers and approach to achieve these 
objectives. The policy requires the Commission to use the tools of persuasion 
and promotion, and the provision of information and model arrangements in 
agreement with all stakeholders to reach the goals. However, it should not 
hesitate to use regulatory powers where other approaches are not working. 123 If 
new or amended rules are inevitable or substantial changes are proposed to 
existing ones the Commission is required to consult with all the affected parties. 
To fulfil these ambitious tasks the Commission is organised into advisory groups 
where specialists with the necessary expertise develop solutions, regulations and 
rules and make further recommendations. 124 The wide power of the Commission 
also includes the responsibility for monitoring compliances, investigation in 
alleged rule breaches, enforcement action and setting up a board adjudicating 
with alleged breaches. 125 
To protect consumers and to encourage them to switch retailers the 
Commission is required to develop a model contract for domestic consumers 
reflecting realistic expectations of the demand side concerning clear and 
understandable terms and conditions in regard to the transparency of price 
components, the frequency of billing, dispute resolution, information 
management, special arrangements for low income consumers and consumer' s 
complaints resolution scheme, including process details and compensation. 126 
More efficient use of electricity on the demand side will result in less pressure 
on prices, resources and the environment. To maximise the efficiency potential 
123 Ministry of Economic Development "Policy Statement on Electricity Governance", above n 
122, 5. 
124 Ministry of Economic Development "Policy Statement on Electricity Governance", above n 
122, 5. 
125 Ministry of Economic Development "Policy Statement on Electricity Governance", above n 
122, 6. 
126 Ministry of Economic Development "Policy Statement on Electricity Governance", above n 
122, 7. 
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the Commission should estimate the cost of the realisation on the downstream 
market as well as the cost of efficiency realisation in generation and the 
management of transportation losses and constraints. 127 
After negative experiences with the security of supply during the past few 
years, the responsibility of the Commission was extended to model and forecast 
solutions for various scenarios, to avoid future shortages. This was also closely 
connected to system operation standards, and the management of the wholesale 
and related markets. As part of the modelling and the forecasting the 
Commission should be responsible for the final decision on grid investments. 
The overall objective of this task is to maintain acceptable system and quality 
standards. 128 
As the Government recognised the substantial work to be undertaken by the 
Commission, especially in that early stage of establishment, the Commission 
released a statement of intent to set its priorities and provide the future direction 
of its work. 129 The work programme is organised around six core work streams 
reflecting the priorities. 130 The Commission's current priority work is attached to 
the areas of market operations, market design, transmission, supply and demand 
modelling and forecasting, reserve energy and electricity efficiency. 131 
The generation sector can be influenced not only by setting rules for the 
participants but by playing an active role in the market. To fulfil the obligation of 
securing supply, the Commission itself is contracting existing generators of ring 
fence reserve energy. In cases of higher demand or critical generation capacities 
these contracts could be exercised in the wholesale market to avoid shortages. 
The secondary side of this market intervention is expected to effect a price 
smoothening to avoid price volatility. To increase security of supply the 
127 Ministry of Economic Development "Policy Statement on Electricity Governance", above n 
122, 10. 
128 Ministry of Economic Development "Policy Statement on Electricity Governance", above n 
122, 22. 
129 Electricity Commission "Statement of Intent 2004 - 2007" (Wellington 2004) 16. 
130 Electricity Commission "Statement of Intent", above 129, 17. 
131 Electricity Commission <http://www.electricitycommission.govt.nz> (last accessed 4 August 
2005). 
Commission entered into an agreement with the Crown, which owns a new 
power plant at Whirinaki just built in order to supply reserve energy to the 
market, adding this plant into the portfolio of the reserve energy management of 
the Commission. 132 Under this agreement the operation of the plant is subject to 
the consent and instructions of the Commission, so that the Commission acts as a 
quasi executive manager. 133 
Optimal wholesale and retail market designs are the main working fields in 
the competitive areas. The Commission does not set price caps but is required to 
achieve optimal outcomes in the up- and downstream market. To improve the 
outcome the Commission focuses on the development of a working hedge market 
system to avoid price volatility and remove barriers for market entry, reviewing 
market competition including pricing behaviour, developing model contracts for 
domestic consumers and promoting products and incentives for more efficient 
energy use and renewable energy generation. 134 The current hedge market is 
critically characterised as a seller's market where generators use their market 
power to keep the market nontransparent with a product availability for potential 
retailers without own generation capacities, which is left after the seller has 
secured its own risks. 135 
In response to several forecasts expecting a major shortage in generation and 
transmission capacities, the Commission has the right for the final decision on 
major transmission projects and investments. 136 At present the Commission is 
involved in the consultation process on a requested Transpower proposal of a 
400kV high voltage alternating current (HV AC) double circuit transmission 
system to secure supply in Auckland's growing economy. 137 
132 Reserve Generation Capacity Agreement. <http://www.electricitycommission.govt.nz> (last 
accessed 8 August 2005). 
133 Reserve Generation Capacity Agreement, above n 132, s 4.3. 
134 Electricity Commission "Statement of Intent", above n 129, 19. 
135 Kierran Murray & Toby Stevenson "Report Prepared for the Electricity Commission: Analysis 
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Retail Electricity Markets" (30 August 2004), 32. 
136 Electricity Governance Regulations and Rules, Part F. 
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3 Electricity Governance Rules and Regulations 
The Electricity Governance Regulations, enacted 2003, were provided for the 
monitoring and enforcement of the rules developed by the Commission and made 
by the Minister of Energy under s 172h of the Electricity Act 1992 and 
terminated the work of the self-regulating bodies. 138 The Commission started to 
enhance the existing self-governing rules that it inherited consistent with 
Government policy. These rules are the principal tool for influencing market 
behaviour and are called the Electricity Governance Rules, which are developed 
through a working group and consultation process involving all market 
participants. The rulebook replaced various former anti-competitive industry 
arrangements and set out numerous objectives, duties and responsibilities for 
market participants as well as for the Commission itself. 139 They cover a wide 
range of industry and market operations such as common quality, ancillary 
services, metering arrangements, registry information, customer switching, 
reconciliation, transport trading, pricing, dispatch, clearing and settlement and 
transition from industry to independent regulation. The continuous maintenance 
and advancement of the rulebook in cooperation with the participants to improve 
market systems and reduce compliance and transition costs are an ongoing 
project and a core function of the Commission performed by the Electricity 
Governance Rule Committee (EGRC). 140 The EGRC's main focus and 
responsibilities include the initial fact-finding on rule breaches, investigation into 
such breaches, surveillance of the informal settlement process, recommending to 
the Commission that pretended breaches are transited to the Rulings Panel, and 
granting of exemptions. 141 
The Rulings Panel is the independent adjudicator dealing with formal 
complaints of rule breaches by participants. The members are appointed by the 
Commission. If a complaint is approved, the Panel has various options to react 
such as imposing penalties against the party, which is in a breach, awarding costs 
or compensation, issuing suspension or termination orders, and recommending 
138 Electricity Governance Regulations 2003 s 3 ( I) (a). 
139 Electricity Commission "Annual Report 2003/2004" (Wellington, 2004) 14. 
140 Electricity Commission "Statement of Intent", above n 129, 9. 
141 Electricity Commission "Statement of Intent", above n 129, 9. 
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rule changes. After a consultation process and several submission rounds the 
final Rulings Panel procedure became effective on 1 June 2005.142 
4 Evaluation 
In summary, the Commission is required to concentrate on consumer 
protection, electricity efficiency, security of supply, system operation, wholesale 
and related markets, transmission, distribution, and retail competition. It 
prioritises its work on the security of supply and reserve generation, priority 
investment in the transmission grid, hedge market arrangements, and demand 
side participation. 
In this regard New Zealand's regulatory framework meets, in theory, a lot of 
the OECD standards of good regulation mentioned above but many concerns 
remain. The concerns are particularly related to the regulatory framework 
concerning the exceedingly active role in the generation sector, which influences 
all related markets and could limit the progressive market forces. The assumption 
that the Government accepted, contrary to the SOE Act, lower returns of SOE to 
secure supply, the less transparent and currently illiquid forward electricity 
market resulting from vertical integration and the lack of long-term price signals 
to guide investment decisions are the major barriers of a working regulation. 143 
Indeed, the crucial point of this role in the generation and reserve energy market 
contradicts the OECD policy of as little intervention as possible. 
But as outlined in this paper, there exists no panacea for the design of 
successful regulation; even the OECD recommendations are just guidelines 
which have to be adapted to special circumstances. It remains to be seen whether 
the regulatory regime will be successful or not. Against the background of the 
industry's failure to carefully enough and the fear of future insecurity of supply, 
1
~
2 Electricity Rulings Panel Procedure 2005 (Wellington, 2005) Part I, 3. 
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the current design need not categorically fail and is a good starting point to 
develop a country specific design of a regulatory regime which meets New 
Zealand's needs. 
G Interrelationship with the Commerce Commission 
The Government Policy Statement on Electricity Governance 2004 set out the 
expectations regarding the interrelationship between the Commerce Commission 
and the Electricity Commission. 144 The policy empowers the Electricity 
Commission to work in the network related fields of reliability standards for the 
national grid, investments, terms and conditions for network connection, pricing 
methodologies, generation connection to distribution grids, and terms and 
conditions for the use of lines by retailers. The Commerce Commission manages 
different issues concerning the network operations and is the authority for 
investigations of assumed breaches under the Commerce Act 1986. It is clear that 
the functions of both Commissions affect one another and there could be a 
danger of conflict. 145 In respect of the optimisation of regulatory jurisdiction and 
transparency of communication and decision processes the Commerce Act 1986 
has been amended to transfer the responsibility for the lines businesses at any 
time for Transpower, but not before 1 April 2009 for the distribution sector, by 
Order in Council from the Commerce Commission solely to the Electricity 
Commission. 146 The principle jurisdiction on network issues is still at the 
Commerce Commission. By doing so the legislator met recommendations of the 
industry, which had a solid history with the Commerce Commission. 147 However, 
issues relating to security of supply and transmission investment decisions 
currently rest with the Electricity Commission, so it makes sense to transfer the 
144 Ministry of Economic Development "Policy Statement on Electricity Governance", above n 
122, s 101-108. 
145 Ministry of Economic Development "Policy Statement on Electricity Governance", above n 
122, s 105. 
146 Commerce Act 1986 Part 4A, s 57 DB, 57 DC. 
147 See for example: Chen, Palmer & Partners "Report Prepared for Vector Limited and Powerco 
Limited on the Interface between Commerce Commission and Electricity Commission" 
(Wellington 2004) 15. <http://www.vectornetworks.co.nz> (last accessed 8 August 2005). 
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complete jurisdiction for all network related businesses from the Commerce 
Commission. 
H Criticism on the System 
New Zealanders are paying currently 30-40 per cent more than they paid for 
electricity in 2002. 148 The situation on the retail market is not as competitive as it 
could be, caused by difficulties in generation and transmission investment and 
capacities and poor electricity efficiency of domestic consumers. 149 On the first 
glance it seems that the big New Zealand power companies are profiting very 
well: Contact announced a $195 million profit for 2005, $50 million more than 
last year and double since 2000; Meridian announced $160 million, the biggest 
profit in the company's history. 15° Consumer associations propose price caps for 
retail prices to protect consumers and assume that the power companies raise 
prices to see how much they can get away with before regulation will be 
introduced.151 Indeed, the last new retailer entered the market in 2001 and the 
rate of customer switching is stable but low, which indicates a low grade of 
competition but not necessarily a market failure. 152 The industry is currently 
facing severe problems in the generation and lines businesses which of course 
impacts retail prices, but price caps are an inadequate approach as price volatility 
on the wholesale market has to be necessarily balanced by price adjustments on 
the retail market to avoid the fatal consequences shown in California. Thus 
politicians from most parties agree that a price cap is not the right solution. 153 
On the other hand there are the arguments of the representatives of the 
industry. They are of the opinion that higher power use and not enough 
investment are the main reasons for the high power bills reflecting costs and 
148 Marta Steeman "Practical Power Boss Looks for Solutions" (10 August 2005) The Dominion 
Post. 
149 Mouroungane & Wise, above n 143, 10-12. 
150 Marta Steeman "The Power to Run a Meter" (30 July 2005) The Dominion Post 
151 Steeman, above n 150. 
152 Murray & Stevenson, above n 135, 17. 
153 Steeman, above n 150. 
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saving surpluses for the future. 154 According to this opinion the demand is 
expected to grow annually at the size of Dunedin's consumption and existing 
generation can not satisfy the need. 155 But it is also true that there is great 
potential on the demand side for saving energy, as New Zealand's energy 
consumption is higher than in the US and demand side behaviour heavily 
influences the supply side and investment behaviour.156 By just looking at power 
companies' profits and retail prices, which are still relatively low in comparison 
to other OECD countries and are just subject of complaint because consumers are 
used to low prices, we risk losing sight of the problems meeting current and 
future electricity needs. Hydro power is facing strong opposition of residents, 
and the Maui gas field, which has secured cheap energy for more than 20 years, 
is running out and so the future mix of generation will change to more coal and 
fuel fired stations, where the production costs more than double. 157 Otherwise the 
relatively high retail prices are so economic that, for example, Meridian is 
investing in new wind farms and is currently investigating new hydro options to 
address problems on the generation and supply side. 158 Therefore the current 
pricing could also be seen as an incentive for other potential investors to invest in 
new generation capacities which would increase security of supply as well as 
competition on the wholesale market and would in that way achieve the 
Government's policy objectives illustrated above. 
As in all developed countries, the overall performance of New Zealand's 
economy strongly depends on the performance of the electricity industry. The 
main challenge for the sector is to invest sufficiently in generation and 
transmission in the face of the high risk issues: the isolation from other countries, 
which eliminates the possibility of electricity import; high distances and the 
dependence on hydro resources with limited storage capacity and vulnerability to 
seasonal energy shortages; climate change and the environmental concerns to 
develop coal or nuclear power. On the other side, growing demand also affects 
the need to further investment in the line and generation capacities. In this 
154 Steeman, above n 150. 
155 Keith Turner "Generating a Surplus to Secure the Future" (8 August 2005) The Dominion Post. 
156 Mouroungane und Wise, above n 143, 10. 
157 Turner, above n 155. 
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respect the active intervention of the Electricity Commission could be qualified 
as it is likely to inhibit private investments rather than provide the necessary 
incentive which is encouraged by the current price development. 159 The present 
market caution is in particular an expression of the uncertainty of how the 
Electricity Commission will approach its task of security of supply, especially if 
it will play a major role on the market or will be more passive. Meanwhile the 
very existence of the Commission as a potential player is seen as a barrier for 
market entry. 160 Therefore the regulatory uncertainty regarding jurisdiction and 
decisions is indeed an element of restraint which influences also market 
behaviour of the industry and which has to be removed. Furthermore the 
Resource Management Act lengthens the planning and developing phases of any 
major project, which may also create obstacles for efficient and profitable 
investment. 161 
Against the background of the failure of the industry to establish a self-
regulatory regime consistent with the Government policy these arguments go 
against themselves as the industry itself was responsible for planning, forecasting, 
investing, and maintain the country's electricity supply. This is evident by 
Trustpower's submission on the Reserve Generation Discussion Document, 
which believed in the market's bias to balance supply and demand, but identified 
the lack of responsiveness, the lack of commercial performance pressures and the 
thinness of contract markets of the state owned generators as the root of the 
problems. 162 It is basic knowledge that the electricity industry business has to be 
planned in the long term, and not focus on short term profits, despite competition 
cooperating for the benefit of the country's development. So the lack of 
capacities either in generation or in transmission seems to be an excuse for poor 
business policy during recent years, for which costs are now passed on to the 
consumer. The winners are at present the shareholders, including the 
Government, which received more in dividends ($527 million) from the three 
159 Mouroungane & Wise, above n 143, 11. 
160 Murray & Stevenson, above n 135, 38. 
161 Mouroungane, above n 143, 11. 
162 Trustpower Submission to Ministry of Economic Development on Reserve Generation (June 
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SOEs than they have invested in power plants. 163 This extraordinary benefit to 
the Government is an obvious contrast to its own policy - empowering the 
Commission to influence the market on the generation stage - as there is 
obviously enough profit drawn which could be invested in new capacities instead 
of being distributed to the Government. The Electricity Commission could ease 
this dilemma. In fact, the pure possibility of market invention by participating on 
the wholesale and generation market could discipline the electricity companies 
and to force them to reach the desired balanced outcome concerning further 
investment in security of supply especially in relation to the investment 
behaviour of the SOE dominating the generation sector. Consequently the 
problems on the related markets mentioned above would also be reduced, after 
solving issues in generation and transport. 
The total shift from a liberalised market system to a strictly regulated regime 
provoked severe criticisms in particular of the large-sized market participants. 
There were concerns that the costs of the Commission could be higher than the 
expected benefits or even the economic losses of the shortages in 2001 and 2003. 
The unusual decision to intervene massively on the generation market was at the 
centre of this criticism but the Government had declared that the intervention to 
secure supply was just a response to specific circumstances and could not be 
generalised and the approach of the Commission should have minimal adverse 
impacts on the market. 164 Despite this declaration, the intervention has sent 
mixed signals to the market. The concern is that this intervention could have a 
massive impact on all related markets and would diminish incentives for 
investments in new generation capacities as well as in new technologies. 165 
Indeed the question remains if other tools could be used to regulate the upstream 
market problems more efficiently than playing an active role in the market. 
Meanwhile the management of the generation capacity to secure supply is the 
major cost pool of the Commission 's budget, which is covered by the industry. In 
this respect the establishment of hedge market products under the Commissions 
control and regulations, on both the up- and down-stream markets, to secure long 
16
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term investment decisions, lower barriers for market entry on all competitive 
stages and secure participants against volatile prices show considerable potential 
for development and could produce the desired outcome of lower costs. 
Most submissions on this subject addressed the policy in relation to the 
Commission's direct market participation, and proposed less active involvement 
not exceeding the role of a regulator. 166 Due to the fact that the Commission has 
just begun to take a more active role there no evidence of these major concerns, 
especially against the background of the failure of the self-government regime. 
The regulatory system has to be seen as a clear solution to the major problems in 
the industry in reversing some negative elements of the free market reforms. 
Even if New Zealand's own experience was to show examples of the reform 
process not achieving its desired results, the positive aspects of the liberalisation 
process outweigh a lot of disadvantages. Despite mixed results, there is no doubt 
that the liberalisation process has led to continued growth of New Zealand's 
economy and the current approach of state intervention seems to be justified on a 
case-by-case basis to secure this success. The Commission needs to specify 
clearly how it will deal with the major concerns as quickly as possible to 
participate productively in this development. For its part, the Government needs 
to make sure that planned changes in the Resource Management Act effectively 
reduce the risk of long delays in project approval without curtailing proper 
consideration of the environmental dimensions involved. 167 It also has to remove 
the discussed antagonism concerning security of supply policy and current 
business policy of SOEs in the generation sector. So the approach of direct 
intervention in the areas of severe concern could be efficient if exercised 
carefully. To solve the manifold problems the Commission has to address the 
obstacles in the generation market, transmission investment and pricing first, 
while mitigating the concerns of its own role by designing a transparent and 
comprehensible decision process to create a reliable environment. 
166 See for Example Submission to the Electricity Commission on Whirinaki Offer Strategy by 
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The establishment of the Electricity Commission in the existing design is the 
logical consequence of the development over the last 20 years. The pre-eminent 
question is not whether the Electricity Commission should be empowered but 
rather how and to what extent the given power should be exercised. The mere 
existence of the Electricity Commission could apply pressure to the industry to 
achieve the objectives of the policy outlined above on its own and without 
massive intervention of the Commission. The future then will show if the 
developed activities and regulatory tools will withstand reality and market 
mechanisms and be able to solve the problems. In consideration of the 
Commission's role in the market, the industry still holds considerable power to 
limit the scope of regulation and keep invention to a minimum. 
IV GERMANY'S APPROACH 
A The Monopoly Market until 1998 
1 The structure of the industry 
Prior to liberalisation in 1998 the industry comprised eight supra regional 
companies which own most of the generation capacities, the transmission 
networks, and also substantial part of the distribution and retail areas, eighty 
regional companies and about 900 local utilities. 168 The regional companies also 
generate, transport, distribute and sell electricity in rural areas. Local utilities are 
often involved in various other infrastructural activities of the community such as 
the distribution of gas, water, heat or public transportation. 169 
Almost 70 per cent of all electricity companies' total shares before 1998 were 
owned by public entities, the rest were private or had mixed ownership. 
170 
Furthermore, major companies own a lot of shares of other electricity companies 
168 OECD Report "Energy Policies of IEA Countries, 1998 Review Germany" (1998) 95. 
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or are linked to other industries such as the oil industry or financial groups and 
since the early nineties the market also realised a tendency to sector 
concentration by exchange of cross shareholdings.171 
2 Concession contracts and price setting 
The German electricity market is characterised by a unique feature which 
plays a major role in the current competitive environment: the practise of 
concession contracts. A concession contract is entered into between a community 
and the distribution network operator, which is given the right to build, operate 
and maintain lines to provide electricity within a well defined area for a fixed 
term of twenty years. In return the municipalities receive concession fees, capped 
by law, which are calculated on a special scheme based on the amount of energy 
consumed in the community. 172 These fees are passed on to the end consumer, 
who is indirectly contributing €2.5 billion to communities' budgets. Because of 
this close connection of municipal authorities to the local utility, the signing of 
concession contracts in former times was just a formality and this long lasing 
partnership formed an opaque melange of politics and industry on a local level. 
The framework of the former price structure was set by the Regulation of 
Electricity Tariffs. 173 Control of the small consumers' tariff is the in the 
responsibility of the Electricity Tariffs Supervision Authority of each single State, 
under the provisions of the Energy Act. 174 Prices for larger industrial consumers 
and for regional utilities are settled through individual negotiations with 
generally increasing rebates on long-term contracts which have also be seen as a 
major barrier to introduce competition in retail. 175 
171 OECD Report 1998, above n 168, 98. 
172 Regulation of the Concession Fee for Electricity and Gass 2 (Verordnung Uber 
Konzessionsabgaben fiir Strom und Gas vom 9. Januar 1992 (BGB1 IS. 12, ber. S.407) § 2). 
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Elektrizitatsversorgung von Tarifkunden 21. Juni 1979 BGB1 I 1979, 684). 
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B The Market Refonn 1998 
1 The European Directive 96/92/EC 
Germany's liberalisation process was initiated by a European Directive and 
not driven by economic needs. Two principles of the EU Treaty apply also to 
electricity: the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital within the 
market and the rules relating to cartel and market abuse. 176 The Directive 
90/377 /EC was the first step towards market liberalisation by defining price 
transparency for large electricity consumers. 177 However, the Directive 96/92/EC 
introduced common rules with stronger measures on the European electricity 
market, and set the framework and the policy for market liberalisation by 
breaking national monopolies. 178 Key features of the Directive were not only for 
the successive retail, full market opening to be established by July 2007, and a 
full generation market opening as a minimum requirement, but also unbundling 
and fair access to the networks. 179 
The overall objective of the unbundling requirements was to avoid 
discrimination, cross-subsidisation within vertically integrated companies and 
distortion of competition. 180 Articles 13-15 required separate accounts and the 
Member States or any settled competent authority to have the right to inspect 
these accounts. 181 
Network access was considered the crucial issue and main barrier to 
competition. The underlying idea was that network operators are obliged to allow 
generators and consumers to have access to their networks to trade in accordance 
with the objectives of transparency and non-discrimination. The Member States 
176 Fran~ois Boisseleau The Role of Power Exchanges for the Creation of a Single European 
Electricity Market: Market Design and Market Regulation (PhD Thesis Universities of Paris IX 
Dauphine and Delft, 2004) 30. 
177 Directive 90/377/EC 
178 Explanatory Memorandum of the Electricity Directive 96/92, l <http://europa.eu.int> (last 
accessed I July 2005). 
179 Directive 96/92/EC, s 23. 
180 Explanatory Memorandum, above n 178, 4. 
181 Directive 96/92/EC, Article 13. 
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had the choice of three models, establishing negotiated or regulated third-party 
access or single buyer procedure. 182 
The Directive was the framework for the national legislator on how to create a 
competitive market at the national level. All European member states radically 
changed the structure of their electricity industry but without standardised 
guidelines or experience on how to organise details, which are recognised as 
essential for market and reform success. 183 Hence the result was a wide range of 
different reform approaches reflecting the different national interests. 
2 The German Energy Act 1998 
Germany's Energy Act 1998 brought the Directive into national law. It was a 
very short amendment to the existing Energy Act. 184 Germany chose a very 
"light-handed" model which is distinctly unique amongst the world's examples 
today. 185 
Ahead of the European schedule, Germany's entire electricity market was 
open to all consumers and exceptional provisions concerning the electricity 
industry were removed from competition law. 186 The possibility of a volume 
threshold to adapt market rules step by step without causing impacts or market 
disruption on the economy was ignored. 187 Simultaneously the exclusive 
concession contracts in relation to retail areas were abolished, but the concession 
fees for the community remained. 188 For the use of the networks, Germany 
182 Directive 96/92/EC, Articles 16-18. 
183 Boisselau, above n 176, 38, 39. 
184 Gert Brunekreeft "Regulatory Threat in Vertically Integrated Markets: The Case of German 
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established negotiated third-party access, whereas most countries in the EU opted 
for regulated third-party access. 189 The minimal requirement of financial 
unbundling was also transferred into national law. 190 
These rapid changes were accompanied by remarkable policy decisions: there 
were no rules or guidelines on how new market participants should enter into 
competition, there was no wholesale market creation, nor was there any 
specification on the third-party access. 191 In tandem with these developments 
Germany also renounced also the establishment of a regulatory body to control 
market behaviour in the monopoly businesses. The Government relied on the 
responsibility and self-regulation of the market participants. 192 
One reason for this unusual choice of very light-handed market liberalisation 
is found in the structure of federalism. A detailed federal legislation would have 
clashed with legislation and jurisdiction of the federal states, a soft touch would 
not. In such a situation Parliament alone was able to pass the new law, while a 
detailed version had to be also passed through the Upper House, with a different 
majority. 
3 The private governed reform 
The reform was basically private and self-regulated.193 Due to the necessity of 
coordination the German Electricity Association (VDEW), the Federation of 
German Industry (BDI) and the Association of the Industrial Energy and Power 
Industry (VIK), which is the association of large energy consumers, entered into 
voluntary negotiated agreements (VV), which were all limited to two years 
duration and then monitored. 194 Private consumers, small businesses and new 
189 Energy Act 1998, s 6. 
190 Energy Act 1998, s 9. 
191 Glachant, Dubois & Perez, above n 185, 3. 
192 Glachant, Dubois & Perez, above n 185, 3. 
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retail companies were not involved and were also excluded by the second 
agreement. 195 The third agreement came into effect from January 2002 and the 
number of participating parties increased.196 On the plus side the small consumer 
associations participated this time and a special task force of the Federal Ministry 
of Economics operated as a moderator. On the other hand, the industry had split 
into four components with the appearance of three new players, the associations 
of grid operators, of regional utilities and municipal utilities. 197 The VV were 
neither legally binding nor were recommendations legally binding. The VVI did 
not work because the agreed rule of setting distance-related tariffs for network 
access were considered discriminatory by the European Commission and were 
replaced by a rate based on the point of connection in the VVII. 198 Further 
changes involved the abolishment of special "service fees" for administration, 
registration, and switching, which were invented by the incumbents to build 
barriers for consumers who want to swap to another retailer. 199 
4 Regulation by competition authorities 
Though the network access rules and methods for calculating tariffs were set 
in an almost totally private environment there was some control exercised by the 
Federal Cartel Office (FCO). The traditional regime of the FCO of intervention is 
ex post, as it is generally judged as an impediment of efficient regulation in 
industries such as electricity.200 
The ex post jurisdiction has an inherent disadvantage in establishing a fair and 
competitive environment: most claims and cases are opened through the abuse of 
195 Second Association Agreement on Criteria for the Regulation of Network Access Fees 13. 
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196 Association Agreement on Criteria for the Regulation of Network Access Fees for Electric 
Energy and Principles on Network Access 13. December 2001 (VVII+) Verbandevereinbarung 
Uber Kriterien zur Bestimmung von Netznutzungssentgelten fiir elektrische Energie und Uber 
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dominant market power by incumbent utilities and these companies have the 
power and the stamina to protract proceedings. New market participants mostly 
do not have the financial backing and struggle against the big players. 
Furthermore, the cases are decided on case-by-case basis and not by precedent 
and decisions made by the FCO can be challenged in court. 
But the FCO has also a limited possibility to influence the electricity sector in 
intervening ex ante in certain topics.201 The FCO has the right under the law to 
block private agreements which violate competition law. Since the signing of the 
VVI the FCO has chosen the strategy of using pressure and negotiations to 
influence these cartel agreements and not block them. 202 The reason for this 
approach was to keep the transition more competitive rather than provoke 
confrontation. Second, in April 2001 a working group was established by FCO 
and the cartel offices of the States and presented a report in which it had drafted 
joint concepts for establishing when abusively excessive fees are being charged 
for using networks, as well as guidelines for assessing other impediments to 
network access. 203 So the participants of the VV received guidelines on how to 
act and also a distinct signal what to expect when entering into agreements that 
abuse market power. 
A third powerful tool of ex ante intervention is the role of the authority in 
accepting merger proposals. The allowance of mergers and acquisition of shares 
in the electricity industry is often connected to the implementation of competitive 
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C The Effects of the 1998 Reform on the German Market 
1 General overview of the market 
After market liberalisation, foreign companies entered into the lucrative 
market acquiring several major stakes: the French EDF-Group, the largest 
electricity company worldwide (holds a 45.01 percent share in EnBW AG), and 
the Swedish Vattenfall Group which bought Hamburg's municipal utility and a 
44.8 percent share in Berlin's utility BEWAG.205 At the same time a growing 
number of independent retail companies entered expecting to profit from 
liberalisation. 206 In the years between 1998 and 2002 several retailers were 
initially successful but went bankrupt by-and-by because of high marketing costs 
and decreasing margins.207 The rationale for this shake-out can be found in the 
institutional framework: vertical integration of competitive and monopolistic 
businesses provides an incentive to secure profits in the natural monopolies and 
set low margins at the competitive stages which frustrates development of active 
competition and the entry of new market participants. This means that the profits 
in generation and retail are low while the profits in the wire businesses are 
inadequately high. 208 Economists estimate that incumbent vertically integrated 
operators in this manner have closed at least 40 per cent of the retail market, 
because the margin is below cost.209 
2 Market concentration and protection 
Despite market reform and unlike European policy objectives, the structure of 
the German electricity industry still remained strongly vertically integrated. An 
oligopoly dominates Europe's largest electricity market and now four supra-
205 OECD Report 2002, above n 197, 101. 
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regional players have heavily increased their participation in local utilities, which 
often look for a strong strategic partner without losing their independence and 
local identity.210 This oligopoly still owns 83 per cent of the generation capacities 
and the transmission networks, but also calls a major part of the distribution and 
retail their own.211 This structure is not very constructive for the establishment of 
a competitive environment, but it may represent the policy desires of the 
legislator.212 Background to this assumption is the economic fact that German 
incumbent utilities are relatively small in comparison to Russian, American or 
French energy giants. Therefore there is a considerable nervousness about 
foreign takeovers which might endanger the high quality of supply in Germany 
which could also jeopardise Germany's role as an industry and investment 
location. The four supra-regional companies balance the internal market pressure 
and still remain strong enough to bargain with big international players.213 These 
companies also control the interconnector capacities, which are presently 
operating at full load, so that without investment in further interconnection 
capacities there will be no additional competitive pressure on the domestic 
market from generators in adjacent countries.214 
3 The distribution sector 
The four supra-regional companies, the regional companies and 850 mostly 
municipality-owned utilities still operate the distribution networks on the local 
level and are still almost without exception the retailer in their distribution 
network areas.2 15 Liberalisation abolished exclusive distribution and retail rights. 
The market liberalisation had a severe and unintended impact on this stable 
system, namely the start of competition on distribution networks: competition is 
increasing in the ownership of existing distribution networks. The distribution 
network in Germany, formerly seen as an assured asset, is now subject to 
210 OECD Report 2002, above n 197, 120; Brunekreeft &Twelemann, above n 207, 8. 
211 Brunekreeft, above n 184,287. 
212 Brunekreeft & Twelemann, above n 207, 4. 
213 Brunekreefl & Twelemann, above n 207, 4. 
214 Brunekreeft & Twelemann, above n 207, 4. 
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competition attracting investors. It was inherent to the monolithic structure of the 
concession system that the retail of electricity was economically connected to the 
network operation. Most concession contracts were re-signed in the late 80s or 
early 90s, far away from taking liberalisation into consideration during 
negotiation. Thus a special clause, meant to be pro forma, in all existing 
concession contracts provides the possibility for the community or another 
grantee to buy the distribution grid for the replacement value. Due to generally 
very good maintenance, depreciation and amortisation of this fixed asset the 
replacement value is much lower than the capitalised earning value over the 
contract period of at least ten years. This difference between these two values is 
the main profit of the distribution network operators. As a consequence the 
following new and unexpected scenario emerged: towards the end of a 
concession contract the community has to publish the end of the contract and 
interested parties can enter into negotiation.216 In case of a successful change of 
the grantee, the incumbent operator has to sell the grid to the new grantee losing 
the profit from the network for at least ten years. 
Due to the principle of unbundled markets the retail in this lost distribution 
area still remains with the former operator, but having all the customers' details, 
the new grantee can enforce marketing operation to win also the consumers in 
the concession area for its own retail department. Additionally, to the lost of the 
network and the profit out of it, costs are increasing to protect the retail market 
and this squeezes the small left margin in retail even more. The nature and 
assured duration of concession contracts implicates the security of the return of 
investment and guarantees high profits for a fixed term. 
4 Evaluation 
The German idiosyncratic reform model of self-regulation has little 
resemblance to any other competitive model in the world. 
216 OECD "Reviews of Regulatory Reform - Regulatory Reform in Germany: Electricity, Gas, 
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It is therefore surprising that neither the access fees for the networks, nor 
wholesale prices, nor the retail price to industrial consumers provide immediate 
evidence of monopoly dominated abuse, either by agreement or cartel until 
2001. 217 Between 1998 and 2000, even for household consumers, electricity 
prices decreased significantly. Initially and in opposition to all economic theories 
this bizarre model seemed to work quite well. After four years of liberalisation 
the transmission grid fees were lower than in France or Spain and even below 
British rates after ten years of liberalisation.218 The wholesale market price was 
also very reasonable between €25 and €30 per MWh compared to stable a €35 
over a ten year period in England.219 
Liberalisation and competition in the electricity market has shown modest and 
unexpectedly positive tendencies. These tendencies disappeared after the low 
price phase. All price components are still showing a slight increase and for 
domestic consumers, prices are now higher than pre-liberalisation, which is of 
course not only related to higher retail prices but is also a result of the extent of 
tax components reflecting the German environment policy. 220 Taxes for 
electricity consumed by domestic users rose about 56 per cent during the last 
four years but pricing behaviour of the big players also impacts the economy as 
all supra regional companies are currently facing investigation because of strong 
suspicion of multilateral price arrangements. 221 All in all and in the light of the 
outcome described above the system of ex-post control was a totally inadequate 
design for effective control of the industry and the proper enforcement of the 
European policy objectives. 
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D Sector-Specific Regulation 
I The European Directive 2003/54/EC 
The European Union Commission was not satisfied with the outcome of a free 
and unregulated market and announced another Directive to advance market 
liberalisation. In 2001 the EU Commission released a proposal to amend the 
existing Directive 222 . The new Directive 2003/54/EC 223 included some key 
elements of an energy liberalisation package and represented a major step 
towards fully competitive and liberalised markets. It introduced an obligation to 
open the retail market for all industrial and commercial electricity and gas 
consumers by July 2004 and all others by July 2007.224 It also required a legal 
separation of lines businesses from the competitive parts. 225 But even the 
possible positive effect of this rule was weakened by not being applicable to 
local utilities with less than 100,000 customers. For the German market this 
meant that almost 85 per cent of all utilities were exempt from unbundling - a 
valuable competitive advantage. 
However, the core of the Directive was the requirement to establish an 
independent economic regulator from July 2004 with specified duties related to 
network fees and transparency of financial unbundling, and monitoring the 
market in respect of fair competition.226 Hence the German regime of negotiated 
third-party access lapsed and had to be replaced by regulated third party 
access.227 In that context it is notable that Germany was successful in influencing 
and weakening the Directive to the effect that the regulator was only required to 
222 European Commission (200 la) Proposal for a Directive Amending Directives 96/92/EC and 
98/30/EC Concerning Common Rules for the Internal Market in Electricity and Natural Gas 
<http://europa.eu.int> (last accessed 7 July 2005). 
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Repealing Directive 96/92/EC 26. June 2003. 0.J. LI 76/37 <http://europa.eu.int> (last accessed 7 
July 2005). 
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agree to the methodology underlying the calculation of network fees and 
subsequently the level of the charges could remain subject of ex post control.228 
2 The Energy Act 2005 
In response to the new Directive, in 2003 the German Ministry of Economics 
and Labour (BMW A) released a monitoring report reviewing the development of 
the German gas and electricity market.229 In this report the BMW A described the 
condition of the electricity market positively but announced further actions to 
implement the guidelines of the Directive. In early 2004 the modified Energy 
Act 230 was drafted and passed through Parliament in April 2005. The Act 
introduced the legal basis for the establishment of a sector-specific regulator, 
which was proposed to be part of the Regulator of Telecommunications and Post 
Services (RegTP) and should be called REGTP: Regulator for Electricity, Gas, 
Telecommunications and Post Services. The proposal fulfilled the minimum 
requirements of ex-ante regulation of calculation methodologies. Strengthening 
the rights of consumers the Act also included clear provisions on unbundling of 
the networks organisationally as well as financial and regulations as frameworks 
for the management of network access. It also adopted the cost-based 
methodology set out by the VV, but left a loophole to modify the system for 
incentive regulation. 
Again there was a legal requirement for affirmation of the Upper House. This 
time the German Government coalition of the Social Democrats and Greens was 
confronted with a majority of conservative representatives of the States as well as 
pressure from the EU, to implement the Directive into national law. The 
proposed Act did not pass the upper house. The arbitration committee agreed on 
several elaborate changes and the new Act became effective on 13 July 2005. 
228 Gerl Brunekreefl &Twelemann, above n 207, l. 
229 Ministry of Economics and Labour ,,Monitoring Report of the Ministry of Economics and 
Labour lo the German Parliament on the Energy-Economical and Competitive Effects of the 
Association Agreements" (31 August 2003); (Berichl des Bundeswirtschaftsministeriums fUr 
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230 Draft Energy Act <hllp://www.bmwa.bund.de> (last accessed 8 July 2005). 
3 The Federal Network Agency 
Main features of the new Act included policy change to a complete ex-ante 
regulation based on the further development of incentive regulation, which 
means that the network charges have to be allowed by the regulation authority, 
which is now called the Federal Network Agency (FNA).231 State agencies will 
take over responsibility of regulating companies with less than 100,000 
customers but are allowed to mandate the FNA232 . At the same time the right to 
sue for associations such as consumers organisations was abolished. 
The FNA's main task will be the creation of efficient and competitive up- and 
downstream-markets by regulating and unbundling the gas and electricity 
networks. This duty includes the management of an implied non-discriminatory 
network access as well as the control of the fees charged by the utilities for the 
network access. Furthermore the provisions of the unbundling of the network 
businesses and the responsibility of the grid operators to sustain the system are 
subject to supervision of the FNA. The new agency will not control or check the 
pricing in the end consumer market as this task is fulfilled by the cartel offices of 
the states and by the civil courts. Pricing of nationwide operating retailers are 
still controlled by the FCO. 
E Criticism of the System 
The reform is characterised more by disjointed incrementalism than by 
fundamental changes and more by improvement and consolidation of the existing 
system. 233 The major problem of the past was the self-protective and anti-
competitive behaviour of the incumbents, which kept access seekers off the 
market in particular through the use of natural monopoly power. The established 
players took a loss by resetting the margins of retail at low or even under cost, 
231 Federal Network Agency (Bundesnetzagentur). 
232 Energy Act 2005 (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz 7. Juli 2005, BGBl 12005, 1970). 
233 OECD "Reviews of Regulatory Reform - Regulatory Reform in Germany: Government 
Capacity to Assure High Quality Regulation" (2004) 5. 
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while gaining in the lines businesses and merging and cooperating with local 
distributors and retailers to secure retail areas and turnover, and to increase 
market power and secure profits. This behaviour was more or less tolerated by 
the Government. The low margins and high marketing costs avoided noteworthy 
competition after 2001, but the first years have proven that unregulated retail 
markets could work, but natural monopolies need regulation to prevent the 
benefits of a liberalised market. Even less than 5 per cent of the households have 
switched their retailers during the last years 234 but almost one third has 
negotiated better conditions for their contracts.235 In contrast, an estimated 35 
per cent of commercial customers have changed to a new retailer and 65 per cent 
have negotiated better prices.236 These figures show that the competition on the 
retail market is triggered by the economic pressure of large consumers and that 
long-term benefits could be achieved in the electricity industry by market 
pressure and competition. On the other hand the domestic consumer behaviour is 
also influencing the marketing strategies of the electricity industry. In particular 
consumers of medium and small local and regional companies, still mostly 
owned by the communities, show a high grade of loyalty and simply refuse to 
switch, even when the prices are higher than of any competitor in the area. The 
reason for this "anti-competitive" consumer behaviour is that these companies 
play a major part in the infrastructure and social life of these communities as a 
major local employer, as an important local sponsor and infrastructure investor. 
Therefore moderate higher prices are mostly accepted, because the profit of these 
companies benefits the consumer's community. Consumers particularly in rural 
areas and smaller cities are not willing to increase profits of out-of-town and 
especially foreign companies. That local patriotism is the major asset and centre 
of marketing activities for the local players know that a change of the retailer is 
not only price driven in smaller communities where due to the unbundling 
threshold of 100,000 consumers competition is anyway practically excluded. 
As the FNC has not begun operating, there is no performance information. 
The fact that the regulation is in hands of the experienced regulator for 
234 OECD "Reviews of Regulatory Reform" above n 2 I 6, 26. 
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telecommunications and postal services with the independence from political 
interference, gives the impression that the Ministry of Economics can take 
electricity regulation seriously. The FNC will have more authority and wider 
scope of power than the FC0.237 In contrast to the FCO's decisions, the regulator 
has the power to set its decisions effective unless overruled by a court. As 
mentioned earlier the court procedure challenging FCO decisions were abused by 
the incumbents to delay the final decision.238 
Despite the establishment of a sector specific regulator there is only some 
optimism that the work of the FNA will really increase competition. The control 
of network access as the main industrial barrier is the starting point for effective 
regulation as the recent shift of major margins from the retail to the lines 
businesses acts as the major barrier for competition. The regulation of the 
network charges certainly will affect a decrease of access charges with 
consequences to both, the up- and the down-stream market. It is expected that the 
access regime of the new regulator will lead to a decline of the network profits, 
by squeezing out monopoly profits. On long-term efficiency and to balance the 
lost, the incumbent integrated companies will pay more attention to the 
competitive businesses of generation and retail. This expected increase of market 
activities on the retail market could attract more new and independent retailers, 
as margins for the sale of pure energy will rise, but the price differences has to be 
so significant that they create an incentive even for the consumers focused on 
their traditional local retailer. As margins are less significantly different, it is 
doubtful that the price driven incentive will be big enough to increase the 
migration rate. The same effect will take place in generation. Profitable entry 
opportunities will change the high risk financial investment of generation market 
entry, with the side effect of abolishing under-investment, modernisation by the 
continuous replacement of out-dated generation technology and supply security. 
The system of concession contracts outlined earlier would facilitate 
competition in the networks and allow new entries in this lucrative business, but 
it is not regulated at all. The lines are the backbones of the industry, so the 
237 Brunekreeft & Twelemann, above n 207, 16. 
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incumbents fear real competition on ownership of the grid. The set up of rules by 
an authority regulating the process of the transfer, pricing and line quality of the 
concession contracts and consequently the ownership of the lines from an 
incumbent to a new grantee would increase the pressure on the natural monopoly. 
The danger within this unregulated "concession contract market" is that financial 
investors taking over ownership would run down the lines to maximise profits 
within the duration of the contract. Hence, security of supply and grid quality 
could be jeopardised in the long-run. Regulatory intervention in this segment 
could enforce competition and simultaneously preserve security and quality in 
the distribution sector. Instead of creating a competitive and innovative 
regulatory framework, the system is not governed, which means that the outcome 
will be motivated by self-protection and anti-competitive behaviour of the 
current lines owners. 
Furthermore the industry's expectation in the regulator's success is low. A 
survey of local utilities' business expectations showed that more than 75 per cent 
think that the chosen regulatory regime will increase electricity costs 
significantly as more than 100 new obligations concerning reporting, monitoring 
and publishing information have to be fulfilled by the companies binding huge 
resources. Though they believe that there will be some progress in the fair access 
of the networks, real competition is not to be expected.239 
Indeed it is doubtful if a real competition will be sustained in the near future. 
The phase out of nuclear power seems to provide an opportunity to de-
concentrate the generation sector, but the concentration on gas fired plants also 
increases the dependence of independent generators from gas companies which 
are owned by the four large supra-national companies. 240 The coexistence of the 
large players for decades also implies a remaining interaction concerning market 
issues and market behaviour.241 The change of the structure, major mergers and 
acquisitions of other assets in the sectors of gas, water and waste have led the 
incumbents to diversify their businesses and offer new products, such as 
239 Ernst & Young "Survey on Local and Regional Utilities" (Berlin, 25 April 2005) Press 
Release <http://www.ey.com> 
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electricity combined with waste management for communities. The 
concentration of the sector within a few years has to be judged in a larger, all-
European context. It is not surprising that, regarding the design of the regulator, 
this development reflected the political policy since the late 90s, which was in 
reality the preparation of the German electricity industry for the open European 
market, less than introduction of the underlying European policy of 
competition. 242 As a result of this model the German Industry is much better 
prepared for the market opening in 2007 than their European competitors, 
because of advanced restructuring and preparation for an all European-market, 
protecting own assets and markets at the same time. Thus, the regulatory regime 
and the underlying provisions of the Energy Act seem to follow the letter of the 
Directive and its administrative burden but not its spirit as national oligopolies 
has strengthened their market hold and small local utilities as important regional 
players are largely excluded from control. 243 The expectation of decreasing 
network access prices as the nostrum for the removal of all obstacles and to 
create a competitive market could be curtailed against the background of the 
policy commitment as it is likely that German incumbents will be able to 
generate profits above long run marginal costs to build up free reserves to sustain 
competition in a European market. 
Another major problem will be the split of responsibility between the FNA 
and the equivalent agencies on the state level concerning information exchange, 
reliability and predictability of decisions made by the various bodies. In this 
regard the different orientation of State and Federal energy policy goals bear the 
danger of different approaches of these regulators. Though there is a legal 
possibility to authorise the FNA with state powers, it is unlikely that the States 
will delegate these powers to the FNA. It is more likely that this will lead to the 
establishment of an additional sixteen State network agencies where a lot of 
resources will be spent on coordinating single activities. So the scale of the future 
regulatory design creates uncertainty for market participants, whether the 
regulatory structure will affect commercial operations 
242 Thomas , above n 9, 11. 
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The major problem of the regulator is that it has to establish a European 
policy, nobody, whether the industry itself nor the Federal and State 
Governments are related to. Commitment on the highest political level to the 
underlying policy is the most important principle for successful regulation, which 
is lacking in Germany. Facing several major blackouts in Europe during the last 
three years, the Commission has to rethink whether the policy is more efficient to 
allow national governments to regain control of the electricity industry again to 
follow more country specific regimes than a general European one.244 
VII CONCLUSION 
Despite great similarities such as light-handed liberalisation, unregulated 
third-party access and the tum to a sector specific regulator, both systems are not 
really comparable. On the one hand, New Zealand's approach was triggered by 
economic need and policy makers were forced to reach the best outcome for the 
country's economy in terms of the balance of benefits for the electricity industry, 
consumers, potential investors and the public interest. Following the trial-and-
error method New Zealand's electricity industry has gone through fundamental 
and irreversible changes during the past 20 years, which provide a chance to 
design a regulator to match the industry's needs. Though the Electricity 
Commission has wide powers which in a way contradict the ideas of democracy 
and liberalism, its current design and set of powers could be evaluated as a 
completion of the achievements of liberalisation. The outputs of the near future 
will show if the chosen approach is the most efficient and if the set up and the 
specific design of the Electricity Commission is an appropriate solution to fix 
market design errors and the failure of self-regulation and solve the problems, 
particularly in the generation and lines sector, in the long-term. 
Following the European policy of market liberalisation, an intact industry 
structure was changed in Germany, in reality not to start competition on the 
domestic market but be preparing for the all-European market participation. The 
244 Thomas, above n 9, 12. 
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implementation of the European policy into national law was half-hearted as 
neither the national Government nor the industry itself had adapted the spirit of 
the policy. Hence, it is not surprising that the Government and the industry in 
contrast to other market participants like commercial or domestic consumers 
promote the reform as a success. The implementation of the requirements of the 
new Energy Act 2005 and the establishment of the regulators will cost a lot and it 
is expected that prices will increase because of the expected high costs of 
implementation. In this respect Germany faces the bizarre situation of a 
regulatory regime which will increase electricity prices significantly and will 
have marginal effects on competition. This could be eventually justified with 
greater weight to issues of public interest such as the security of supply, but it 
seems that it was just designed to satisfy a European policy which does not meet 
the country's needs. As in New Zealand, the following years will show the 
efficiency of the chosen system, but it is unlikely that in the German model 
benefits ever will outweigh the costs, at least not on the national level. 
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